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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Intelligence Agents as Authors: A
Comparison of the British Courts'
Position on Attorney-General v.
Heinemann Publishers and the
United States Supreme Court Decision
of Snepp v. United States
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1976, Peter Wright retired from a twenty-one year career with
the British Security Service. I Throughout his career, Wright had
gained access to virtually all classified information concerning British
intelligence and the intelligence of other major world powers. 2 Upon
his retirement, Wright signed an agreement 3 stating that he would
remain bound by the Official Secrets Act 4 and would not communi-
cate any information gained through his position as an agent, unless
given prior written approval.
5
After leaving the British Security Service, Wright stated many
times that the Service had been penetrated by Soviet agents. 6 In order
1. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers and Others, Observer, Ltd. and Others,
Times Newspapers and Another, I W.L.R. 1248, 1254 (1987), [hereinafter Guardian Newspa-
pers, I W.L.R. 1248, Chancery Division, July 1987].
2. P. WRIGHT, SPYCATCHER (1987).
3. Her Majesty's Attorney-General In and For the United Kingdom v. Heinemann Pub-
lishers Australia Pty. & Another, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division, pro-
ceeding no. 4382 of 1985, 13 Mar. 1987, at 57. On interlibrary loan from the Library of the
Embassy of Australia, Washington, D.C. [hereinafter Heinemann Publishers, Supreme Court
of New South Wales, Equity Division, Mar. 1987].
4. Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 28 [hereinafter Official Secrets Act].
5. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers and Others, Observer, Ltd. and Others,
Times Newspapers and Another, I W.L.R. 1248, 1293-94 (1987), per Lord Templeman [here-
inafter Guardian Newspapers, 1 W.L.R. 1248, House of Lords, Aug. 1987].
6. Wright initially submitted to the House of Commons a memorandum outlining his
allegations that the Service had been penetrated by Soviet agents. Id. at 1301, per Lord
Ackner. Later, Wright made both radio and television broadcasts on the subject. London
Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at 7, col. a. Heinemann Publishers, Supreme Court of New South
Wales, Equity Division, Mar. 1987, at 127, 129-31, supra note 3.
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to publicize these allegations, and in spite of his secrecy agreement,
Wright wrote the memoirs of his experiences as an M15 agent in the
book Spycatcher.7 Rather than writing and publishing his book in
England where the British court could immediately cite him for
breach of confidentiality and violation of the Official Secrets Act,8
Wright moved to Australia where Spycatcher was to be published by
Heinemann Publishers. 9 The British government was able to delay
the publication of Spycatcher in Australia with a grant of interim re-
lief by the Supreme Court of New South Wales.10 However, Wright
easily managed to have a United States company publish his book."1
In response, senior judges in the House of Lords in England de-
nounced the United States legal system for allowing the unauthorized
publication of government secrets.' 2 The judges were primarily con-
cerned that the First Amendment always mandates that the right to
free speech trump national security interests.1 3 In an opinion con-
cerning the Wright case in which British newspapers were enjoined
from reprinting material from "bootlegged" copies of Spycatcher in
the daily papers, Lord Ackner stated:
Mr. Wright appears to have 'got away with it' altogether... If the
publication of this book in America is to have, for all practical
purposes, the effect of nullifying the jurisdiction of the English
courts to enforce compliance with the duty of confidence [owed by
an intelligence agent] . . . then, English law would have surren-
dered to the American Constitution. There, the courts, by virtue
of the First Amendment, are, I understand, powerless to control
the press. Fortunately, the press in this country is, as yet, not
above the Law .... 14
7. P. WRIGHT, SPYCATCHER (1987).
8. Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 28.
9. Guardian Newspapers, 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1301, House of Lords, Aug. 1987, per Lord
Ackner, supra note 5.
10. London Times, Sept. 17, 1985, at 6, col. d. The Supreme Court of New South Wales
is a trial court in Australia. The interim relief granted was a temporary injunction, barring
publication of Wright's manuscript in Australia until the full investigation of the Attorney-
General's claims at the March 1987 trial. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers and
Others (No. 2), Observer, Ltd. and Others, Times Newspapers and Another, 2 W.L.R. 805,
815 (1987-1988) [hereinafter Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), 2 W.L.R. 805, Chancery Division,
Dec. 1987].
11. The Attorney-General did not pursue a claim for injunction in the United States. See
infra note 43 and accompanying text.
12. Guardian Newspapers, 1 W.L.R. 1248, House of Lords, Aug. 1987, supra note 5.
13. Id. at 1286, 1306.
14. Id. at 1306, per Lord Ackner.
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Relative to other countries, England and the United States share
a common history and similar legal systems. Yet, in the area of free-
dom of expression, the two countries differ in one significant aspect:
while the United States has inscribed on parchment the right to free-
dom of expression, England does not. As a result, English jurists,
such as Lord Ackner have apparently been given the impression that
the First Amendment has forced United States courts to defer to the
press in all cases.1 5
To determine the precise impact of the First Amendment in the
case of a former agent who publishes government secrets, this Com-
ment compares the British courts' position on the case of Peter
Wright, hereinafter referred to as Wright,16 with a similar case in the
United States, Snepp v. United States,'7 in which former intelligence
agent Frank Snepp published a book entitled Decent Interval which
divulged the details of covert operations in Vietnam.18 Comparing
how the United States legal system, one with a free speech amend-
ment, deals with the former agent who publishes government secrets,
with how the British legal system, one with no such constitutional
amendment, treats the same issue, enables a determination of
whether, and in what ways, the First Amendment influences consider-
ation of national security interests. The British legal system is used in
this comparative model because there are historical and legal con-
stants between England and the United States. Comparing the
United States with a country other than England would make it diffi-
cult to draw conclusions about the impact of the First Amendment,
15. There is currently a strong movement in England, drawing support from politicians
and laypersons, to adopt a version similar to the First Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution. Such a law in England would be detailed in form to restrict specific types of speech,
such as the dissemination of government secrets. Discussion with Professor Maurice Cranston,
London School of Economics and University of California, San Diego, in La Jolla, California
(June 14, 1988). See JACCONNELLI, ENACTING A BILL OF RIGHTS (1980).
16. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. See also infra note 47.
17. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
18. Over ten years ago, the issue of divulging government secrets was presented with the
emergence of the Pentagon Papers case in the United States and the Frank's Report in Eng-
land. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). For a discussion of the Frank's
Report, see B. DeSmith, The Right to Information About the Activities of the Government, in
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: ESSAYS FROM THE LAW SCHOOL IN EXETER 137 (1973). The
Frank's Report was issued by a committee for the Crown to compare the espionage laws of
foreign countries with the Official Secrets Act. Id. Now, the Wright and Snepp cases provide
an opportunity to reexamine this same broad issue of divulging government secrets. However,
this Comment addresses only the issue of publication of government information by former
government agents, and not the issue of publication by newspapers.
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since other variables may contribute to the courts' disparate treatment
of the legal issue.
Following a presentation of the facts and holdings of Snepp and
of the British position on the Wright case, this Comment compares
how each country treats a former agent who publishes intelligence
information. The comparison is divided into four parts: (A) a com-
parison of the use of secrecy contracts; (B) a comparison of the use of
statutory law; (C) a comparison of how each court presents and bal-
ances the competing secrecy and freedom of speech interests; and (D)
a comparison of the remedies imposed. Each part of the comparison
considers whether Lord Ackner's conception that the First Amend-
ment precludes consideration of national security concerns is true.
Further, the comparisons focus on how each court does and should
deal with the opposing national security and freedom of speech inter-
ests. In conclusion, this Comment proposes which legal system best
fosters the interests of national security while maintaining consistency
with the values of freedom of expression.
II SUMMARY OF THE Wright and Snepp Decisions
A. The Wright Case
1. Facts of Wright
On September 1, 1955, Peter Wright began his employment with
the British Security Service. 19 At that time, Wright signed an agree-
ment binding him to follow the Official Secrets Act of 1911.20 He
agreed not to communicate information obtained by virtue of his em-
ployment in the Service to "any person, other than a person to whom
he is authorized to communicate it, or a person to whom it is in the
interest of the State his duty to communicate [it].
' '
21
Wright was assigned a position in MI5, the counter-intelligence
19. Heinemann Publishers, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division, Mar.
1987, at 18, supra note 3.
20. Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 28.
21. Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 28, § 2, sched. 1 states in relevant part:
If any person having in his possession or control any. . . information which.., has
been entrusted in confidence to him by any person holding office under His Majesty
or which he has obtained owing to his position as a person who holds or has held
office under His Majesty, or as a person who holds or has held a contract made on
behalf of his Majesty, or as a person who is or has been employed under a person
who holds or has held such an office or contract,-(a) communicates the... informa-
tion to any person, other than a person to whom he is authorized to communicate it,
or a person to whom it is in the interest of the State his duty to communicate it ...
that person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
[Vol. 11:345
Intelligence Agents as Authors
branch of the British Security Service, to research, track, and develop
counter-intelligence devices. 22 He also developed and carried out a
series of counter-espionage schemes. 23 Performing these duties re-
quired Wright to have knowledge of a great deal of sensitive intelli-
gence information. 24  Just prior to his retirement from MI5 on
January 31, 1976,25 Wright signed an acknowledgement that he
would remain bound by his initial secrecy agreement and maintain his
duty of confidence owed the Security Service. 26 As stated above,
Wright chose to violate his duty of confidence by writing the memoirs
of his experiences as an MI5 agent in the book Spycatcher. In Spy-
catcher, Wright provides a thorough account of covert operations in
which he took part, detailing the types of devices used, dates, and
names of agents involved.
27
In September of 1985, the British government attempted to pre-
vent publication of Spycatcher by suing for an injunction against
Wright and his publisher, the Australian branch of Heinemann Pub-
lishers. 28 The government contended that Wright was bound by the
Official Secrets Act to maintain the confidence of all information he
received while an M15 agent.29 The government supported its posi-
tion by presenting the agreements that Wright signed at the time of
his employment and at the time of his retirement. 30 Wright re-
22. Heinemann Publishers, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division, Mar.
1987, at 1-3, 6, 12-14, supra note 3; P. WRIGHT, SPYCATCHER, chs. 1-5 (1987).
23. Id.
24. P. WRIGHT, SPYCATCHER chs. 1-5 (1987).
25. Guardian Newspapers, I W.L.R. 1248, 1254, Chancery Division, July 1987, supra
note 1.
26. [T]he Official Secrets Act applied to him after his appointment had ceased, that
he was fully aware that serious consequences might follow any breach of the provi-
sions of those Acts, and that he understood "that I am liable to be prosecuted if
either in the United Kingdom or abroad I communicate, either orally or in writing,
including publication in a speech, lecture, radio or television broadcast, or in the
press or in book form or otherwise, to any unauthorised [sic] person any information
acquired by me as a result of my appointment ... unless I have previously obtained
the official sanction in writing of the department by which I was appointed." In
addition to the obligations of secrecy expressly acknowledged by Mr. Wright, he was
also under an obligation arising out of his employment by the Security Service and
enforceable in equity not to divulge any information which he obtained in the course
of his employment.
Guardian Newspapers, 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1293, House of Lords, Aug. 1987, per Lord Tem-
pleman, supra note 5.
27. P. WRIGHT, SPYCATCHER (1987).
28. The action was brought as proceeding No. 4382 in the Supreme Court of New South
Wales. See London Times, Sept. 17, 1985, at 6, col. d.
29. London Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at 7, col. a.
30. Id.
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sponded that he had divulged no classified information or information
which would seriously harm the national security.3 The court
granted interim relief which prevented publication only within Aus-
tralia, and only until conclusion of the New South Wales trial. 32 Sub-
sequently, the Australian Heinemann Publishers granted publication
rights of Spycatcher to Viking Penguin, Inc., a United States subsidi-
ary of the English Pearson Group, an English publishing company. 33
As the trial in New South Wales commenced in 1986, and tem-
porary injunctions over Wright's manuscript were still in effect, Eng-
lish newspapers began reporting on the trial and on allegations made
in the manuscript form of Spycatcher.34 Injunctions, in effect until
trial or further order, were issued by Millet J. against the newspa-
pers. 35 The Millet injunctions "restrained the newspapers from pub-
lishing or disclosing any information obtained by Mr. Wright in his
capacity as a member of M.I.5."'36 The newspaper reports and conse-
quent injunctions generated a great deal of litigation [hereinafter "the
newspaper cases"], much of which is still pending in United Kingdom
courts.
3 7
In March of 1987, the Supreme Court of New South Wales
handed down its decision dismissing the injunction restricting publi-
cation of Spycatcher.3 8 The Court stated that Wright owed a duty of
31. London Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at 7, col. b. Guardian Newspapers, I W.L.R. 1248,
House of Lords, Aug. 1987, supra note 5.
32. The House of Lords stated, "Interim relief obtained in New South Wales apparently
did not prevent Mr. Wright and the Australian Heinemanns from publishing outside Austra-
lia." Guardian Newspapers, 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1295, House of Lords, Aug. 1987, per Lord Tem-
pleman, supra note 5. Wright presents an interesting jurisdictional issue as to why the New
South Wales court was unable to enjoin worldwide publication of Spycatcher and what other
legal alternatives the Attorney-General could have pursued to prevent such publication; how-
ever, this Comment focuses on comparing the substantive law of the United Kingdom and the
United States which concerns publication of intelligence information by former government
agents.
33. Id.




37. In chronological order, these cases are: Attorney-General v. Newspaper Publishing
plc and Others, 3 All E.R. 276 (1987); Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers and Others,
Observer, Ltd. and Others, Times Newspapers and Another, 1 W.L.R. 1248 (1987); Attorney-
General v. Observer, Ltd. and Another, 1 All E.R. 385 (1987); Attorney-General v. Guardian
Newspapers and Others (No.2), Observer, Ltd. and Others, Times Newspapers and Another, 2
W.L.R. 805 (1987-1988).
38. Heinemann Publishers, Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division, Mar.
1987, at 274, supra note 3.
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confidentiality to the Security Service. 39 However, the court felt com-
pelled to dismiss the injunction, due to the fact that by the time of
trial, Wright had already made public most of the sensitive informa-
tion contained in the Spycatcher manuscript through television and
radio broadcasts.40 As for other material in the manuscript to which
the Crown objected, the court stated that a great deal of it had been
divulged in years past by other agents' books.4'
In May 1987, Viking Penguin in New York announced its inten-
tion to publish Spycatcher.42 Assuming the First Amendment would
render a claim for an injunction to prevent publication a futile effort,
the Attorney-General for the United Kingdom failed to bring suit
against Wright or Viking Penguin in the United States courts.43 Vi-
king Penguin began printing Spycatcher in July of 1987.44 Since then,
over one million copies have sold throughout the world.45
In September 1987, the Attorney-General appealed the Supreme
Court of New South Wales' decision to allow publication of Spy-
catcher in Australia. 46 Both the appeal to the Supreme Court of New
South Wales, Court of Appeal47 and the appeals to the High Court of
Australia4 were unsuccessful. Each time the Attorney-General ap-
pealed, the deciding court refused to take jurisdiction over any
claims. 4
9
39. Id. at 261.
40. Id. at 130-32.
41. Id. at 258.
42. Guardian Newspapers, 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1295, House of Lords, Aug. 1987, per Lord
Templeman, supra note 5.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Guardian Newspapers (No. 2), 2 W.L.R. 805, 818-19, Chancery Division, Dec. 1987,
supra note 10.
46. Id. at 819-20.
47. Attorney-General (U.K.) v. Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty. and Another,
Supreme Court of New South Wales, Court of Appeal, 75 A.L.R. 353 (1987).
48. Attorney-General (U.K.) v. Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty. and Another, High
Court of Australia, 75 A.L.R. 449, 461 (1987); Attorney-General (U.K.) v. Heinemann Pub-
lishers Australia Pty. and Another, High Court of Australia, 78 A.L.R. 449 (1988).
49. One major reason that the courts refused to take jurisdiction was that the Attorney-
General's claims were based on the public interest of United Kingdom citizens, and not of
Australian citizens. As stated by the court of appeal,
It is against Australia's interests for Australian courts to determine the public inter-
est of a foreign country in a suit brought in Australia by a foreign government. Aus-
tralian courts determine the public interest of Australia, not of foreign countries, so
the claim [against Wright and Heinemann Publishers] for breach of an equitable obli-
gation of confidence [of government secrets] fails because it is not justiciable ...
Australian courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an action for the enforcement,
either directly or indirectly, of a penal, revenue or other public law of a foreign State,
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
However, the Attorney-General has one final legal avenue. He
could appeal to the Privy Council in England, which hears appeals
from countries throughout the United Kingdom and Commonwealth
of Nations. 50 Since Australia is a part of the Commonwealth of Na-
tions, cases from the High Court in Australia may be appealed to the
Privy Council. 51
In the newspaper cases, the English courts considered all issues
concerning Wright's publication. In order to decide whether the
newspapers should be allowed to publish excerpts and summaries of
Spycatcher, the courts had to determine whether Wright had the right
to publish intelligence information gained by means of his employ-
ment. The courts also needed to form an opinion about Wright's ac-
tions in order to answer the Attorney-General's most recent demands
that the courts impose future-oriented restrictions on Wright and any
other agents who publish confidential government information. The
position of the English courts, particularly that of the highest court,
the House of Lords,52 and that of the judges deciding the most recent
newspapers case in late 1987 and early 1988,11 will be used through-
out this Comment to relate England's legal approach and reasoning
on the issue of former agents who publish intelligence information.
This Comment follows the litigation concerning Wright through Sep-
tember of 1988. 
4
2. The Position of the British Courts
The British courts unanimously opposed the publication of Spy-
catcher. The House of Lords based its opposition on the fact that
Wright had breached a duty to maintain the confidence and trust of
and Australian courts will not make a judgment on the public interest of a foreign
state.
Attorney-General (U.K.) v. Heinemann Publishers Australia Pty. and Another, 75 A.L.R. 353
(1987). This reason for refusing jurisdiction reflects the international law principle of sover-
eign immunity. Thus the issue is raised whether the Supreme Court of New South Wales'
decision should be vacated on the basis that exercising jurisdiction infringed upon England's
sovereign immunity.
50. 9 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA Micropedia, at 713 (1988).
51. 1 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, at 872 (1972).
52. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers and Others, Observer, Ltd. and Others,
Times Newspapers and Another, 1 W.L.R. 1248 (1987).
53. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers and Others (No. 2), Observer, Ltd. and
Others, Times Newspapers and Another, 2 W.L.R. 805 (1987-1988).
54. Unfortunately, continuing litigation on the Wright case makes it impossible to ensure
that the cases cited herein are the most current as of the date on which this Comment is
published.
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the Security Service which arose out of his employment.5 5 The court
placed great importance on the permanent nature of the confidential
relationship between an agent, former or present, and the agency for
which he worked and from which he gained privileged access to intel-
ligence information. The court asserted that this duty of confidential-
ity persists independently of the existence of any secrecy contract
signed by Wright.5 6 Publication of Spycatcher would be a plain
breach of that duty. 57 The Chancery Division stated:
It is not in dispute that Mr. Wright was under a duty of confidence
by reason of his employment in M.I.5; nor is it in dispute that his
duty continued after his resignation. The duty, if not contractual,
is a duty recognized and imposed by equity, co-extensive with the
duty that would have been imposed by implied term had the rela-
tionship been contractual. 58
Thus, although the secrecy agreement was not crucial to prove
Wright's breach of confidence, it was helpful to show Wright's ex-
press consent to such a relationship.
The House of Lords argued that a series of government interests
were harmed by the breach of confidence resulting from the publica-
tion of Spycatcher.59 These interests included: (1) the interest of the
government to maintain the secrecy of its sensitive information, so
that other foreign security services will not lose confidence in the Brit-
ish Service's ability to protect their shared secrets; (2) the interest of
the government to prevent future breaches of the duty of confidence
by other agents; and (3) the interest of the government to protect
present and future agents from public scrutiny in areas which, if ex-
posed, would lead to the divulgence of classified information. 60 The
British courts viewed these government interests, together, as a "pub-
55. Guardian Newspapers, 1 W.L.R. 1248, House of Lords, Aug. 1987, per Lord Brandon
of Oakbrook, Lord Templeman, and Lord Ackner, supra note 5.
56. Id. at 1294, per Lord Templeman.
57. Id.
58. Guardian Newspapers (No.2), 2 W.L.R. 805, 840, Chancery Division, Dec. 1987,
supra note 10.
59. Guardian Newspapers, 1 W.L.R. 1248, House of Lords, Aug. 1987, supra note 5.
60. The court explained:
It is likely that any [even unclassified] disclosures of facts relating to the Security
Service by Mr. Wright would ... endanger the effective discharge by the service of its
current and future responsibilities, and as a consequence be of value for a foreign
power and highly detrimental to the public interest of the United Kingdom as well as
causing harm to individual officers, former officers, their families and other persons
who might be identified by or as a consequence of such disclosures.
Id. at 1294, per Lord Templeman (quoting the Cabinet Secretary).
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lic interest in a leak-proof, reliable and efficient Security Service."
61
To the British courts, Wright's breach of confidence and the con-
sequent harm to national security interests required the publication of
Spycatcher to be enjoined. The Guardian Newspapers opinions evi-
dence that the House of Lords conceives the freedom of expression as
a limited right, which can be curtailed to protect national security. In
support of the Millet injunctions, those against the newspapers which
reprinted portions of Spycatcher, the House of Lords stated that the
injunctions would not violate the principle of freedom of press stated
in Article 10(2) of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to which the United Kingdom
adheres.
62
The House of Lords justified the imposition of an injunction over
Spycatcher by considering national security interests an exception to
the right to freedom of expression. Further, they maintained that the
confidentiality between an agent and the Secret Service is crucial in
protecting the national security. The judges maintained this position,
despite the fact that it contained no officially classifed information.
B. The Snepp Case
1. Facts of Snepp
The facts of Snepp v. United States63 are markedly similar to the
facts of Wright. In 1968, Frank W. Snepp III was employed by the
Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"). 64 At that time, Snepp signed a
secrecy agreement which required: first, that he must have specific
approval to publish any matter involving CIA intelligence activities;
and second, that he must not divulge any classified information with-
out the CIA Director's consent.
65
After resigning from the CIA, Snepp published a nonfiction book
entitled Decent Interval in which he criticized the CIA operations in
61. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers and Others (No. 2), Observer, Ltd. and
Others, Times Newspapers and Another, 2 W.L.R. 805, 901 (1988) [hereinafter Guardian
Newspapers (No. 2), 2 W.L.R. 805, Court of Appeal, Feb. 1988]. See also Guardian Newspa-
pers (No. 2), 2 W.L.R. 805, 836, Chancery Division, Dec. 1987, supra note 10.
62. Guardian Newspapers, 1 W.L.R. 1248, 1288, House of Lords, Aug. 1987, per Lord
Brandon of Oakbrook, supra note 5.
63. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 508.
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which he was involved during the close of the Vietnam War.66 Simi-
larly to Peter Wright, Snepp did not divulge any information that was
labeled classified. In addition, Snepp did not submit his book for CIA
approval prior to publication.
67
The United States government filed suit against Snepp in the
United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia. The gov-
ernment sought three orders: (1) a declaration that Snepp breached a
contract with the CIA; (2) an injunction preventing publication of
future writings by Snepp until he submitted the material for pre-publi-
cation review; and (3) an order imposing a constructive trust 68 on any
profits Snepp earned from the sale of Decent Interval.69
Finding that Snepp breached his secrecy agreement to submit his
book for pre-publication review, and that publication of Decent Inter-
val had caused irreparable harm to intelligence activities vital to the
national security, the district court granted all three orders. 70 The
appellate court affirmed in part, yet reversed the order to impose a
66. F. SNEPP, DECENT INTERVAL (1977). See Note, Government Secrecy Agreements and
the First Amendment, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 400, n.29.
67. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507-11.
68. A constructive trust is a specific type of restitutional remedy arising from the theory
of equity. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1, at 222-23, § 4.3, at 240-
41 (1973). Concerned with maintaining equity between the parties, the constructive trust is
aimed at preventing the defendant's unjust enrichment. Id. To accomplish this, the construc-
tive trust "force[s] a restitution to the plaintiff of something that in equity and good conscience
did not belong to the defendant." Id. at § 4.3, at 241. In Remedies, Dobbs presents the clear-
est example of when the constructive trust is appropriately used, as the case of a defendant
who, by fraud, induces the plaintiff to convey a parcel of real property to him. Id. The court
can then declare the defendant to be a constructive trustee, holding the property in construc-
tive trust until transfer to the plaintiff, named as the beneficiary. Id. Furthermore, the con-
structive trust can not only be placed over the principal property deemed to rightfully be
plaintiff's, but also over the "product" of the property; in this way, the plaintiff can obtain the
profit defendant made from the property while it was wrongfully in his possession. Id. at § 4.3,
at 242-43.
Although the courts which reviewed Snepp's case never explicitly outlined the method
used to impose a constructive trust as a remedy, the application of the remedy in the present
case can be described in the following terms. The information concerning CIA operations
which was included in Decent Interval is the property of the United States government, partic-
ularly the intelligence unit of the executive branch, the CIA. Once Snepp breached his secrecy
contract not to divulge CIA information by publishing the information in a book, Snepp be-
came the wrongful possessor of the information. The direct product from wrongful possession
of that government information is the profits earned from the sale of the book to the public.
By placing a constructive trust over those profits from book sales, the district court, and later
the Supreme Court, in effect declared Snepp the trustee of the profits, and obligated him to
transfer the profits to the United States government, as the beneficiary of the profits and right-
ful owner of the principal property, the CIA information.
69. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 508.
70. United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176, 180-82 (E.D. Va. 1978).
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trust over profits. 7 1 The United States Supreme Court, in a per
curiam opinion, reinstated the entire district court decision.7 2 Thus,
the Court upheld the imposition of an injunction on Snepp's future
work until it passed the CIA pre-publication review process, and re-
imposed the constructive trust over the profits from Decent Interval.
73
2. Reasoning of the Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court based its decision to reinstate
the constructive trust over profits on Snepp's breach of contractual
and fiduciary duties as a CIA agent.74 The Court asserted that the
secrecy contract, which stated that Snepp agreed to "undertak[e] a
position of trust"75 with the CIA, bound Snepp to a "trust relation-
ship" 76 with that agency. The Court stated that by not submitting his
manuscript of Decent Interval for pre-publication review and by pub-
lishing the government information disclosed to him in confidence,
Snepp violated his contractual and fiduciary obligations to the CIA.
In order to determine whether or not to reinstate the construc-
tive trust over profits from the book, the Court considered evidence
that the publication of Decent Interval caused irreparable harm to the
security interests of the United States. Evidence introduced through
the testimony of Admiral Turner, then Director of the CIA, intended
to show the effects of Decent Interval on foreign relations. 77 Admiral
Turner testified that with the publication of a book which contained
information about details of the CIA and its operations, "a number of
foreign intelligence services with whom we conduct liaison,... have
questioned whether they should continue exchanging information
with us, for fear it will not remain secret .... [P]eople were unwilling
to enter into business with us."78 With this and other evidence, the
Court found that disallowing pre-publication review by not enforcing
Snepp's secrecy agreements would cause "irreparably harm[ful]" re-
sults for national security.79
The Court found the constructive trust to be an appropriate rem-
71. United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 935-36 (4th Cir. 1979).
72. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 516 (1980).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 510-12, 515-16.
75. Id. at 510 n.5.
76. Id. at 510.
77. Id. at 512-13.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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edy80 for two reasons. First, the Court stated that the alternative rem-
edy of punitive damages offered by the Court of Appeals, was not
feasible, since the government would be forced to "disclose some of
the very confidences that Snepp promised to protect" ' in order to
prove a case for punitive damages.8 2 Second, the Court asserted that
imposing damages which included a constructive trust over profits,
would deter other agents from publishing, without approval, informa-
tion gained by virtue of their privileged access to CIA materials.8
3
III. COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS
The facts of Wright and Snepp are similar in most significant as-
pects. Both involve a retired agent who published unclassified infor-
mation critical of the government agency for which he worked. This
section of the Comment compares these two cases and determines
whether there are significant differences in each country's approach to
the issue of restricting the publication of information gained by intelli-
gence agents in their employment; and, if there are differences,
whether these differences are attributable to the existence of the First
Amendment in the United States and the lack of such an amendment
in the United Kingdom.
The laws of the United Kingdom do not contain an express free-
dom of speech principle which would protect publications. "The lib-
erties of the [British] subject are not expressly defined in any law or
code."18 4 Although there is no codification of the "fundamental liber-
ties of citizens, two codes have influenced Englishlaw."'85 They are
the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights8 6 and the Euro-
pean Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Fairness. 7 These declarations contain express provisions for the free-
dom of the press.
There are four major areas of law, or legal policy, discussed in
both Wright and Snepp which afford valuable comparison. These are:
(A) a comparison of the use of secrecy contracts; (B) a comparison of
80. The constructive trust was reinstated, in addition to the other damages already set by
the district court and not appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 516.
81. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 514 (1980).
82. Id. at 514-15.
83. Id. at 515-16.
84. Halsbury's. VIII at 548-49, para. 828 (1974).
85. Id. at 551, para. 828, n. 2.
86. United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Cmnd. 7662 (1948).
87. Cmnd. 8969.
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the use of statutory law; (C) a comparison of how each court presents
and balances the opposing secrecy and freedom of speech interests;
and (D) a comparison of the remedies imposed.
A. Comparison of the Use of Secrecy Contracts
Traditionally in England, the "gentleman's agreement" ensured
that one who learned of confidential information by virtue of his pro-
fessional position would not publicize that knowledge.a8 A gen-
tleman's agreement is an unwritten agreement, which arises more
from moral obligation than from a bargained for commodity.8 9 Thus,
a former government agent would keep a confidence, because the suc-
cess of a security agency mandated some degree of secrecy, and not
merely because he was paid as an employee to do so.90 However, as
evidenced recently by the Wright and Snepp cases, the gentleman's
agreement is no longer honored. The result has been the development
of the written secrecy contract.
The secrecy agreements between Wright and the British Security
Service, and Snepp and the CIA, are nearly identical in their form and
language. First, the agreements provide that the agent may never
publish government information concerning the agency for which he
worked, unless his material has undergone the pre-publication review
and approval by the appropriate official. 9 ' In both agents' contracts
the pre-publication/prior approval requirement applies to all informa-
tion, classified or unclassified. Second, the agreement binds the agent
to an oath of secrecy. 92 The oath states that the agent is in a relation-
88. Interview with Maurice Cranston, Professor, London School of Economics and Uni-
versity of California, San Diego, in La Jolla, California (June 14, 1988).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. As an express condition of his employment with the CIA... Snepp had executed
an agreement promising that he would "not ...publish ... any information or
material relating to the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either
during or after the term of [his] employment ... without specific prior approval by
the Agency."
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 508 (1980). Similarly, Wright's secrecy agreement
stated:
that I am liable to be prosecuted if either in the United Kingdom or abroad I com-
municate, either orally or in writing, including publication in a speech ... or in the
press or in book form or otherwise, to any unauthorised [sic] person any information
acquired by me as a result of my appointment ... unless I have previously obtained
the official sanction in writing of the department by which I was appointed.
Guardian Newspapers and Others, Observer, Ltd. and Others, Times Newspapers and An-
other, 1 W.L.R. 1248, House of Lords, Aug. 1987, per Lord Oakbrook, supra note 5.
92. For example, Snepp's agreement stated, "I, Frank W. Snepp, III, understand that
upon entering duty with the Central Intelligence Agency I am undertaking a position of trust
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ship of trust and confidentiality with the employer government. 93
Consequently, the secrecy oath gives rise to a fiduciary duty owed to
the government, to further the security goals of the agency.
In finding Wright and his publisher sanctionable for publication
of Spycatcher in the United Kingdom, the House of Lords did not
place great emphasis on the pre-publication review clause or the se-
crecy contract in general. This suggests that Wright was bound by an
unwritten, moral duty to maintain the confidences of the Security
Service. The court found Wright in violation of an unwritten secrecy
oath, regardless of whether a written contract existed between him
and the British Security Service.94 Thus, a requirement of pre-publi-
cation review may help the case against Wright, but such a clause is
not crucial to the government's case. Also, the remedy of injunction
was available through statutory law. The Official Secrets Act, para-
graph 2, in effect, codifies the importance of the confidential relation-
ship between the Security Service and agent.
Just as paragraph 2 of the Official Secrets Act reflects the impor-
tance of confidentiality owed to the intelligence service by an agent,
the secrecy agreement reflects this element in United States law. As
stated above, pre-publication review under United States law requires
that the agent submit the material which he plans to publish to the
Director of the CIA. Congress originally codified this review process
in the National Security Act of 1947. The Act states in pertinent part:
(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of
the several Government departments and agencies in the interest of
national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency . . . (3) to
correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security,
and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence
within the Government.... And provided further, that the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intel-
ligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. 95
in that Agency of the Government . Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510 n.5 (1980)
(citing App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 78-1871, p. 58a).
93. The House of Lords analogizes the agent's duty of confidence with the agency to the
duty to keep confident a trade or business secret. The court quotes from Seager v. Copydex
(1967) 2 All E.R. 415, (1967) 1 W.L.R. 923 at 931, which states that "he who has received
information in confidence shall not take unfair advantage of it. He must not use it to the
prejudice of he who gave it." In Seager v. Copydex an inventor won damages from a company
to which he had told of his invention in confidence, and which divulged this information to
gain an advantage over competitors.
94. Guardian Newspapers, 1 W.L.R. 1248, House of Lords, Aug. 1987, see supra note 5.
95. National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1982).
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This statute allows the CIA Director to both determine the sensitivity
of information by categorizing it into groups such as "highly classi-
fied" and "classified" information and allows the Director to restrict
the publication of such information.
96
The Freedom of Information Act 97 presents a potential obstacle
to the Director's authority. This statute provides that certain infor-
mation concerning the government and its employees must be avail-
able to the public. However, exemption 3 of the statute states that the
National Security Act98 is an exception to the protections afforded by
the Freedom of Information Act.99
In the National Security Act and the Freedom of Information
Act exception, it is evident that the CIA Director has broad discre-
tion to prevent the dissemination of intelligence information.10 The
"Secrecy Agreement" and the National Security Act of 1947 allow
the government to restrict an agent from disseminating information
which concerns the government. The Supreme Court currently holds
that these restrictions comport with the protections of the First
Amendment. 101
In United States v. Marchetti,10 2 ("Marchetti") the court was con-
fronted with classified information used in an intelligence agent's
book The Rope Dancer. 10 3 In that case the two clauses of the secrecy
contract, one agreeing to pre-publication review and the other an oath
of secrecy, were separate. In holding that pre-publication review was
constitutionally valid, the court granted the injunction to suppress the
classified information. 10 4 The law is clear that the CIA Director can
prevent any type of classified information from being disseminated. 10 5
However, the law is less clear where information gathered by an
96. Id.
97. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1974).
98. National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1982).
99. The exemption states "Th[e] section providing that Director of Central Intelligence
Agency shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure [50 U.S.C. § 403] is exempting statute for purposes of Freedom of Information Act
exemption." Id.
100. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 168-69 (1985).
101. The National Security Act delegates authority to limit freedom of speech to the CIA
Director, an official under the Executive department. Thus, the statute is not unconstitutional
under the First Amendment which states only that "Congress shall make no law" abridging
the freedom of speech. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1313 (4th Cir. 1972).
102. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972).
103. Id. at 1313.
104. Id. at 1318.
105. Id. at 1316.
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agent is not classified, although harmful to national security. In
Marchetti, the court found that it is unconstitutional, according to the
First Amendment, to use the secrecy oath to prevent disclosure of
unclassified information. This decision, however, means only that a
breach of the oath will not result in an injunction. 106 Thus, a breach
may authorize a damages remedy or other remedy which is not an
injunction.
In Snepp's contract the secrecy oath and agreement to pre-publi-
cation review were incorporated together in paragraphs throughout
the contract. The oath and agreement did not comprise two separate
contracts, as in the Marchetti case. This unique feature of Snepp's
contract allowed the Court to consider the oath and agreement as
interrelated. The Court held that by failing to submit Decent Interval
for pre-publication review, Snepp violated his specific agreement not
to publish material without approval; and more importantly, the
Court added that this specific agreement merely reinforced Snepp's
broader commitment to maintain a position of secrecy and trust with
the CIA. 10 7 Consequently, rather than finding the agreement for pre-
publication review constitutional and secrecy oath unconstitutional
for certain purposes, such as imposing injunction, the Court implicitly
held the entire contract a valid government effort to protect its na-
tional security interest. The Court found that Snepp should have sub-
mitted his work to the CIA Director both because of the agreement to
do so and because he owed a duty of trust to the CIA. 10 8
The Snepp agreement for pre-publication review and secrecy oath
were not acknowledged as separate agreements, as they were in
Marchetti. By enforcing the importance of the confidential relation-
ship between an agent and the intelligence service through the secrecy
oath, Snepp makes clear that sanctions are constitutionally valid
against the disclosure of unclassified information. Thus, the Snepp
Court carried the enforcement of the secrecy contract a step beyond
the Marchetti holding. This does not yet justify injunction, but it does
allow the Court to impose damages plus a constructive trust over
profits of a book which divulges government information. The impact
of the Snepp Court's holding on the damages issue is discussed in de-
tail in the following section of this Comment.
Despite the existence of the first amendment, the United States
106. Id. at 1317.
107. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510-15 (1980).
108. Id.
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can to some extent "control its press," contrary to Lord Ackner's
opinion as seen above in the Introduction to this Comment. Pre-pub-
lication review is a form of prior restraint, 0 9 as it may mean that an
agent's material is not published due to its content. Coincidentally,
pre-publication review of materials written by former agents about the
intelligence service fits exactly into a very small class of cases which
justify imposition of prior restraints. In American Constitutional Law,
Tribe has identified this class of cases as those which first, "the gov-
ernment prove[s] the unprotected character of the particular speech
with certainty," and second, "harm ... would occur if a pre-publica-
tion restraint were not imposed."' "10
The secrecy oath, mixed into the pre-publication review agree-
ment, evidences a value for an agent's duty of confidentiality which, if
breached, authorizes sanctions. Through a secrecy agreement which
combines pre-publication review with a secrecy oath, the United
States has developed a device similar to the United Kingdom's Official
Secrets Act, discussed below. I ' Both the secrecy contract in the
United States and the Official Secrets Act in the United Kingdom re-
flect the idea that the courts of both countries are willing to impose
restraints on the dissemination of intelligence information by agents,
109. "[T]he doctrine of prior restraint has been used to invalidate ... a variety of restric-
tions on speech." The restraint can either be "prior to a communication's dissemination, or
prior to an adequate determination that (the expression] is not protected by the First Amend-
ment." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1040-42 (1988).
110. Id. at 1051.
American and English essays of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries argued against
prior restraints, such as the licensing system directed by the English monarchy and church
during that time. Id. at 1039. However, even the greatest advocates of freedom of speech
shared the concept of a limited right of free speech. In Commentaries on Laws of England,
Blackstone wrote: "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of'a free state; but
this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from cen-
sure for criminal matter when published." BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON LAWS OF ENG-
LAND Vol. IV, para. 152 (1822). Further reading of Blackstone shows that he considered
"criminal matter" to be that which should not be allowed in the "public forum," such as
matter which is "illegal ... dangerous or offensive." Vol. IV, para. 152. Although The Feder-
alist Papers do not explicitly outline a theory of freedom of the press as do Blackstone's works,
The Federalist Papers as a whole reflect Blackstone's theory of an important free speech right,
but one which can be limited for the sake of maintaining security and order. See THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton) and THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (J. Jay). These early writings evi-
dence that the First Amendment was intended to encourage as much public knowledge and
debate as possible, without encouraging offensive or dangerous speech. Thus, the idea of hav-
ing prior restraints was not nullified by the existence of the First Amendment; and, prior
restraints have remained a part of United States law.
111. Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 28.
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because the agent's duty of confidentiality is important to national
security.
B. Comparison of Statutes
Both the United Kingdom and the United States have criminal
statutes that restrict the dissemination of government information. In
the United Kingdom this statute is the Official Secrets Act' 12 and in
the United States this statute is section 798 of the espionage statutes,
the Disclosure of Classified Information Act."t 3 However, while the
House of Lords partially based its support for an injunction over pub-
lication on Wright's violation of the Official Secrets Act, the Supreme
Court never applied the Disclosure of Classified Information Act to
Snepp." 4 This difference is attributable to the greater pervasiveness
of the Official Secrets Act's application and the United States' hesi-
tance to expand the application of its espionage statutes in the face of
the First Amendment.
The language of the Official Secrets Act is somewhat less restric-
tive than that of the Disclosure of Classified Information Act. The
Official Secrets Act contains two main paragraphs. First, it makes any
person who divulges information with the purpose of harming the
safety or interests of the State guilty of a felony.' '5 Second, and more
applicable to the case in issue, the Official Secrets Act prohibits any
officer of the government, "entrusted in confidence" with information
obtained from his position in the government, from divulging any of
that information. 1 6 The latter has no qualification for information
which is unclassified or found not immediately or greatly harmful to
the interests or safety of the nation. While the Disclosure of Classified
Information Act closely resembles section 1 of the Official Secrets
Act, it criminalizes only the communication by any person of only
classified information. Thus, the Disclosure of Classified Information
Act allows more forms of speech than the Official Secrets Act.
In the criminal context, it makes sense to limit punishable acts to
the purposeful dissemination of classified information or information
which is indirectly harmful to national security. An agent who unin-
112. Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 28.
113. 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1982) [hereinafter "The Disclosure of Classified Information Act"].
114. Guardian Newspapers and Others, Observer, Ltd. and Others, Times Newspapers and
Another, I W.L.R. 1248, House of Lords, Aug. 1987, supra note 5; Snepp v. United States, 444
U.S. 507 (1980).
115. Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 28, § 1.
116. Id. at § 2, sched. (1).
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tentionally publishes information harmful to the national security
cannot be deterred from publishing that information by means of a
criminal statute. The criminal penalties of the espionage statutes act
as deterrence measures against anyone who knowingly communicates
classified information, or information which he knows will harm the
security interests of the nation. If an agent believes his information to
be unclassified or not harmful to the national security, then he will
not consider the statute to apply to him, and so will not be deterred
from publishing his material. However, authors such as Wright and
Snepp aim not to damage national security, but rather to criticize the
operations of the intelligence agencies for which they worked and to
incite reform of the internal problems. Thus, the purposeful intent to
harm national security that is required to impose criminal penalties is
absent in these cases.
However, the absence of criminal, purposeful intent does not ob-
viate the need to restrict the disclosure of information which is un-
classified but damaging to national security for the reasons stated
below. 17 Although criminal sanctions have deterrence value, they
are inadequate as applied to the instant cases. Criminal sanctions
only penalize publication after the damage has been done; they cannot
directly prevent publication.
The United Kingdom courts can prevent publication of intelli-
gence information through the imposition of an injunction justified by
breach of the Official Secrets Act. The House of Lords focused its
support for injunction over Spycatcher on the fact that Wright vio-
lated his oath to abide by the Official Secrets Act. 1 8 Attention was
drawn to the clause stating that an officer of the government must not
betray the "confidence entrusted" in him by virtue of his employment.
The court did not use this violation to voice support for imposing the
misdemeanor penalty prescribed by the Official Secrets Act. Rather,
the court found that a violation of one of the key purposes of the
Official Secrets Act, to protect the confidences entrusted to govern-
ment agents, required an injunction. This would solve the problems
posed by publication, by discouraging future agents from trying to
117. The reasons to restrict the disclosure of intelligence information discussed in section
II, C. are: (1) to maintain the secrecy of its sensitive information, so that other foreign security
services will not lose confidence in the nation's own intelligence agency; (2) to prevent future
breaches of the duty of confidence by other agents; and (3) to protect present and future agents
from public scrutiny in areas which, if exposed would lead to the divulgence of classified
information.
118. Guardian Newspapers, 1 W.L.R. 1248, House of Lords, Aug. 1987, supra note 5.
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publish memoirs, ensuring that no information which could be dan-
gerous to security was divulged, and finally, by maintaining foreign
confidence that government information entrusted to agents is kept
confident. The Wright court thus used a criminal statute to impose
what appears to be in this case a civil remedy, the remedy of injunc-
tion. In this way, the court has reinforced the overarching purposes
of the Official Secrets Act, which embodies the importance of national
security interests.
In contrast, the Disclosure of Classified Information Act plays
no express role in Snepp. As noted in Justice Stevens' dissent, the
statute could apply to Snepp had his book contained classified infor-
mation.119 However, the government did not claim that Decent Inter-
val contained classified information. 120 The Disclosure of Classified
Information Act is nearly identical to paragraph 1 of the Official
Secrets Act, but has no equivalent to paragraph 2, which retricts offi-
cials or employees from divulging any government information en-
trusted to them in confidence.1 2 1  The Supreme Court has no
authority under an espionage statute to restrict the publication of Spy-
catcher, since it contains only unclassified information.
The United States has not interpreted its statutes to apply as per-
vasively as the Official Secrets Act. The espionage statutes such as the
Disclosure of Classified Information Act impose only criminal penal-
ties. Such sanctions would be of little use as safeguards against the
dissemination of any intelligence information. Before a former
agent's book is published,1 22 the Disclosure of Classified Information
Act is inapplicable. Therefore, the only preventive element in the
criminal penalty is deterrence against future violations by the same or
other agents. This is useful, but not as effective in the case of intelli-
gence agents as would be injunctions, which are allowed by the Offi-
cial Secrets Act.
Another alternative in the United States would be to have Con-
119. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
120. Id. at 508-11.
121. The Disclosure of Classified Information Act, 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1982), criminally
sanctions "[w]hoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or other-
wise makes available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudi-
cial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to
the detriment of the United States any classified information." Id. § 798 (a).
122. The term "published" is not defined by statute, or by the secrecy contracts between
employees and the CIA. Arguably, the CIA can consider "publish" to mean either printed by
a publishing company, or simply made known by the employee to persons without security
clearance.
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gress create a specific law modeled on the second paragraph of the
Official Secrets Act, prohibiting an agent from divulging any informa-
tion obtained by means of his position with the government. However,
such a law must not infringe on the protections of the First Amend-
ment. 23 The Supreme Court has established that the First Amend-
ment does not protect speech which poses "irreparable harm" to
national security. 24 Therefore, in a case such as Snepp where the
government proved irreparable harm, a law modeled on the Official
Secrets Act could constitutionally bar the divulgence of information.
However, such a law would be unconstitutional under the First
Amendment because of its language which may bar the publication of
information that did not irreparably harm the interests and safety of
the nation. Finally, because the different Justices of the Supreme
Court over time offer such varied interpretations of the irreparable
harm standard, it would be difficult to predict when a law modeled on
the Official Secrets Act would even constitutionally bar dissemination
of intelligence information.
125
The United Kingdom has not interpreted its freedom of expres-
sion principle into a standard of irreparable or immediate harm.
Rather, free speech interests stand as factors to be balanced against
the interests of suppression, and against the Official Secrets Act. Like
all acts of Parliament in England, the Official Secrets Act cannot be
declared invalid, as a congressional act can be declared unconstitu-
tional by the United States. 26 There is no judicial review of legisla-
tion in England, only judicial interpretation.1
27
The United States' inability to enact a statute resembling the sec-
ond paragraph of the Official Secrets Act makes it impossible to pre-
vent the publication of a former agent's memoirs with an injunction, if
those memoirs contain unclassified information which is proven to ir-
reparably harm national security interests. In the absence of a statu-
123. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). For a general discussion see L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 785-861, 1045-55 (1988).
124. Id. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
125. For example, in the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971), the Court held that publishing classified intelligence information concerning
CIA activities in Vietnam would not irreparably harm the security of the United States, thus
the publication of the information was necessary to enforce the newspaper's First Amendment
rights. On the other hand, the Snepp Court found that the publication of unclassified informa-
tion concerning the same type of CIA activities in Vietnam had irreparably harmed the secur-
ity of the United States. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
126. H.G. HANBURY & D.C.M. YARDLEY, ENGLISH COURTS OF LAW 9-10 (1979).
127. Id.
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tory means by which to enjoin the publication of unclassified
information by an intelligence agent, the United States has relied on
the secrecy contract to protect the confidentiality of government
information.
C. Comparison of the Courts' Treatment of Competing Secrecy and
Free Speech Interests
The Supreme Court and the House of Lords outline similar con-
cerns underlying the national security interest in maintaining the se-
crecy of intelligence information. First, the courts argue that
although the books contain unclassified information, the publication
of a former intelligence agent's book concerning his intelligence activ-
ities is still harmful to security. The Supreme Court explained that,
"when a former agent relies on his own judgment about what infor-
mation is detrimental, he may reveal information that the CIA-with
its broader understanding of what may expose classified information
and confidential sources--could have identified as harmful.' 28 Simi-
larly, Lord Templeman stated:
These [dangers of divulging information which is 'of value for
a foreign power and.., causing harm to individual officers.., and
their families,'] could arise notwithstanding that the information
disclosed was unclassified and is on its face and in isolation appar-
ently innocuous. Such information may take on a wider signifi-
cance if put together with other information in possession of other
persons and thereby, for example, enable them to check the verac-
ity of their sources of information. Furthermore, information
which appears to be innocuous at a particular date or to a particu-
lar officer may at a later date become significant.1 29
The facts of a recent United States case, Haig, Secretary of State
v. Agee,130 support the above arguments by the Supreme Court and
Lord Templeman. In that case, Agee, a former CIA agent, in an ef-
fort to drive CIA agents out of foreign countries, disclosed the classi-
fied names and activities of several agents.' 3' Many of those agents
were murdered soon thereafter. 32 The Court found that due to irrep-
arable harm caused by Agee's disclosures, sanctions against Agee did
128. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 512 (1980).
129. Guardian Newspapers and Others, Observer, Ltd. and Others, Times Newspapers and
Another, 1 W.L.R. 1248, House of Lords, Aug. 1987 per Lord Templeman, supra note 5.
130. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
131. Id. at 285-286, n.7; 308-09.
132. Id.
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not violate his First Amendment right to criticize the government.133
The courts asserted that national security was damaged because
the publication of intelligence information by former agents sends the
message to foreign countries, allies and non-allies, that the agency
lacks the power to maintain confidentiality. The Snepp court stated
that the "CIA obtains information from the intelligence services of
friendly nations and from agents operating in foreign countries. The
continued availability of these foreign sources depends upon the
CIA's ability to guarantee the security of information that might com-
promise them and even endanger the personal safety of foreign
agents."1 34 In Wright, the court made a similar argument, and Lord
Templeman concurred, that not only does publication of the books
undermine foreign confidence in the intelligence agency, but it also
undermines the confidence of agents who still work in the Service and
expect the Attorney-General to protect the public reputation of the
Service. 135
Both courts acknowledge the problem posed by national security
concerns to freedom of expression and freedom of the press. 136 The
House of Lords saw two competing public interests: the public inter-
est in preserving the national security, and the public interest in pre-
serving the freedom of the press. The British courts seemed to favor a
balancing test to determine if the risks to national security outweighed
any need to disseminate intelligence information. 37 The court cited
support for limiting the right to freedom of expression in an exception
for national security, in Article 10(2) of the European Convention on
Human Rights. 38 The court considered freedom of the press an im-
133. Id. at 308-09.
134. United States v. Snepp, 444 U.S. 507, 512 (1980). Cf Justice Stevens' dissenting
opinion, Snepp, 444 U.S. at 520.
135. Guardian Newspapers and Others, Observer, Ltd. and Others, Times Newspapers and
Another, 1 W.L.R. 1248, Aug. 1987, House of Lords, per Lord Templeman, supra note 5.
136. Neither court elaborates on the details of these interests. For a general discussion of
all interests involved in these types of cases, see A. Katz, Government Information Leaks and
the First Amendment, 64 CAL. L. REV. 108 (1976).
137. Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers and Others (No. 2), Observer, Ltd. and
Others, Times Newspapers and Another, 2 W.L.R. 805, 846, Chancery Division (Dec. 1987).
See Guardian Newspapers, 1 W.L.R. 1248, House of Lords, Aug. 1987, supra note 5.
138. The court states:
Article 10(2) provides qualifications and exceptions to which the exercise of free ex-
pression may be made subject. They include such conditions: "as are prescribed by
Law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of National Security
... for the protection of the . . . rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence."
Guardian Newspapers, 1 W.L.R. 1248, House of Lords, per Lord Ackner, supra note 5.
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portant but limited right, and one which could be subordinated to
national security interests.
Despite the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court
in Snepp accepted this same principle of a limited right of free expres-
sion. Although the Snepp Court ended up favoring national security
interests over those of free speech, the Court did not use a strict bal-
ancing test to reach its decision. Rather than viewing the problem as
one of two competing public interests, the Supreme Court reasoned
that the importance of Snepp's secrecy contract to national security,
and the consequent irreparable harm to security that resulted from
Snepp's breach of the contract, took Snepp's actions outside of the
scope of the free speech protections of the first amendment. Im-
pliedly, since the breach did not trigger first amendment protections,
the Court did not reach the stage of balancing the national security
interests with the freedom of speech interests. Thus, the Supreme
Court in Snepp achieved the same result as the Wright court, favoring
national security; however the Supreme Court avoided having to con-
sider the nature and weight of first amendment concerns.
Although this section of the Comment considers only the specific
question of how the courts in the two present cases have dealt with
the competing national security and free speech interests, it is impor-
tant at this stage of the analysis to fit the Snepp decision into a scheme
of current First Amendment law. A comprehensive schematic of First
Amendment law, and a useful characterization of where cases like
Snepp fit into the schematic appears in American Constitutional Law
by Laurence Tribe. 139
Tribe divides laws restricting speech into two categories, "Con-
tent-Based Abridgments" and "Facially-Neutral Abridgments."' 14
Snepp involved, in part, a content-based restriction; the government
sought to restrict Snepp from writing about intelligence information
gained by virtue of his position as a CIA agent, and not merely to
restrict him from writing books about any other subject. In this cate-
gory of content-based restrictions, Tribe includes speech restricted be-
cause it presents a "clear and present danger."' 14 1
The clear and present danger test was applied to the dissemina-
tion of confidential information in Landmark Communications v. Vir-
139. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 12 (1988).
140. Id. at 785-804.
141. Id. at 841; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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ginia.1 42  In that case, the Court held that once confidential
information concerning judicial proceedings had been leaked to a
newspaper, that newspaper could be penalized only if the state
demonstrated that the article posed a clear and present danger to the
administration of justice, and thus mandated secrecy. 143
New York Times v. United States'44 presented the issue of
whether the clear and present danger doctrine would apply to confi-
dential information concerning government secrets. In a per curiam
decision, consisting of nine separate opinions, the Court held that the
newspapers' publications of leaked intelligence information concern-
ing CIA activities in Vietnam would not irreparably harm the na-
tional security interests of the United States. The Court stated that
injunctions would issue only if "disclosure . . . will surely result in
direct, immediate and irreparable damage to our Nation and its
people." 145
The district court, and later the Supreme Court, found that pub-
lication of "Decent Interval caused the United States irreparable harm
and loss."' 146 Thus, the Court in Snepp applied the part of the clear
and present danger doctrine which concerns government information
leaks, to reach a decision which favors national security interests.
Tribe fits Snepp into a group of cases in which the Court consid-
ers the magnitude and quality of the harm, in order to justify imposi-
tion of a prior restraint; he calls these restrictions on speech,
"Constitutionally Permissible Prior Restraints."147 Whereas prior re-
straints are traditionally thought of as presumptively invalid, a series
of cases allowing such restraints have developed and been given prece-
dential effect. The Court in Snepp uses an element of the content-
based category, the clear and present danger doctrine, not only to jus-
tify a restriction on Decent Interval after publication, but also to jus-
tify the use of a pre-publication restriction, the secrecy contract.
Thus, the extension of the clear and present danger doctrine to confi-
dential information leaks, where proof of the danger justifies imposi-
tion of a prior restraint, has contributed to the group of
"constitutionally permissible prior restraints," and eroded prior re-
straint doctrine as it had developed during the 1960's and 1970's, par-
142. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
143. Id. at 843-44.
144. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
145. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971).
146. United States v. Snepp, 456 F. Supp. 176, 180 (1978).
147. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1045 (1988).
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ticularly with the decision of New York Times Co. v. United States. 148
As in Landmark Communications v. Virginia, the New York
Times Court was faced not with the source who initially leaked the
information, but with the newspaper which published the informa-
tion. In Snepp, the Court heavily relied on the fact that Snepp was
not only the source of the initial disclosure of confidential informa-
tion, but was a source who, as a government agent, maintained a rela-
tionship of confidentiality with the government. Thus, Snepp presents
different considerations than the newspaper cases. As stated above,
the Court must look at the magnitude and quality of the harm, in the
case of a foreign agent who divulges information entrusted to him, to
determine if the prior restraint on publication is constitutionally
permissible.
As illustrated by Haig, Secretary of State v. Agee, 149 and the gov-
ernment interests outlined by the Wright and Snepp courts, the degree
and high risk of harm inherent in the disclosure of classified informa-
tion by former agents is great. Although classified disclosures may
not have been intended by Wright or Snepp, such disclosures can re-
sult from publication of their books. Even the dissenting opinion in
Snepp acknowledged the reality that such disclosures are harmful to
national security. 150 The risk of harm from disclosure of intelligence
information is so great as to outweigh the author's desire to criticize
the government and the public's "right to know"'' of such
information.
This does not diminish the importance of the freedom of speech.
The freedom of speech interests at stake when the government seeks
to suppress information are carefully outlined in "Government Infor-
mation Leaks and the First Amendment," by Alan M. Katz. 152 Katz
presents three freedom of speech interests which are harmed by gov-
ernment suppression. 15 3 They are: the freedom to publish without
government interference in order to prevent a chilling effect on all
speech,154 the right of the press to gather information, 1 55 and the
148. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
149. Haig, Secretary of State v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
150. United States v. Snepp, 444 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1980).
151. See Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withold, 120 U. PENN. L. REV. 271
(1972).
152. Katz, Government Information Leaks and the First Amendment, 64 CAL. L. REV. 108
(1976).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 115.
155. Id. at 116.
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desire of a government employee to impart his special knowledge and
perspective to society, in an effort to better the government. 56 The
first interest is an issue in any case concerning speech, no matter how
erroneous or dangerous the speech. However, the policy against es-
tablishing rules which will have a chilling effect on freedom of speech
has, at many points in first amendment law, been overridden by the
competing interests of safety or privacy. 15 7 The second interest, con-
cerning the right to gather information, is not as relevant in the case
of a former intelligence agent publishing a book as it may be in the
case of a newspaper publishing leaked information.
Finally, the third interest is perhaps the most compelling when
applied to the issue at hand. This interest concerns the desire of the
employee to divulge government information in the hopes of encour-
aging government reform. This concern argues strongly against gov-
ernment control over information. Who better than someone
intimately involved in a particular government agency to present a
detailed and learned perspective on that agency, to offer criticism, and
to advocate effective reforms? However, the argument assumes first,
that the published information is accurate, and second, that the au-
thor's goal is governmental reform and not profit. If these assump-
tions are true, then the government agent is in the best position to
advocate reforms. On the other hand, if these assumptions are false,
then the government agent is in the best position to harm the govern-
ment. In either case, the government's interest in maintaining the
confidence of countries through an apparently secret information net-
work is harmed. Moreover, the confidence between an agent and his
government is devalued. Therefore, when the risk of harm to security
is great, such as in the special case of a former agent who discloses
intelligence information gained by means of his employment, the free-
dom of speech principle should be subordinate to the concerns of na-
tional security.
Both the British courts and the United States Supreme Court
reached the decision to subordinate free speech rights to the interests
of national security. Thus, the First Amendment apparently does not
compromise the Supreme Court's ability to favor security interests.
Nevertheless, the First Amendment does affect the way each court
156. Id.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 139-45 for cases where speech is prohibited be-
cause it presents a clear and present danger. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974) for an example of where speech is restricted because it infringes on the privacy of its
subject.
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enforces the idea of limiting free speech rights to minimize harm to
national security.
D. Comparison of Remedies
The secrecy contract allows the Supreme Court some control
over the publications produced by former agents, just as the unwritten
duty of secrecy, as embodied in the Official Secrets Act, allows the
United Kingdom courts control over such publications. However,
there remains a significant difference between United States and Brit-
ish courts with respect to the power and extent of this control. This
difference is attributable to the different sanctions that the courts of
each country are able to impose.
For example, the British courts concluded that an injunction
should be issued against the publication of Spycatcher. The justifica-
tion for such an injunction arises out of the agent's duty to keep secret
the intelligence information gained by virtue of his employment, ac-
cording to the Official Secrets Act. However, in the United States it is
certain only that an injunction is constitutionally allowable over clas-
sified matter 158 and that some type of remedy may be imposed upon
the divulgence of unclassified matter unauthorized by the CIA Direc-
tor for disclosure. 15 9 The Snepp Court did not directly address the
question of whether or not Snepp could have initially been enjoined
from publishing Decent Interval without prior authorization. Since
the book was later held to have irreparably harmed national security
interests, it is likely that the CIA Director would not have authorized
the manuscript for publication, in the event that he had known about
the book. The Court, however, was only concerned with the after-
math of publication.
Imposing a constructive trust over the profits of Snepp's book
was a major step toward gaining increased control over these types of
publications. This step has the force of deterring other agents from
similar actions, because they will be denied any profits from book
sales. In this respect, the result is similar to an injunction, which
would command performance and thus discourage breaches. 160 How-
158. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972).
159. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
160. The remedy of injunction stands in contrast to the damages remedy, which grants
monetary damages to the plaintiff. While the damages remedy allows the breaching defendant
to choose whether to breach the contract and pay damages or to not breach the contract and
avoid paying damages, the injunction offers no choice. The injunction demands performance
of the contract. See D. DOBBS, REMEDIES ch. 2 (1973), for a discussion of the injunction.
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ever, the constructive trust remedy is not likely to deter agents who
publish motivated by the desire for governmental reform rather than
profits.
The constructive trust remedy is similar to punitive damages in
two respects. First, a constructive trust can be placed over profits, if
"the defendant acted as a conscious wrongdoer .... ,"161 By imposing
a constructive trust over the profits from Decent Interval, the Court in
effect brands Snepp's conduct as both intentional and wrong. Similar
to the constructive trust over profits, punitive damages aim to punish
the defendant for wrongful conduct and deter future breaches.1 62
Thus, the court of appeals' decision to reverse the district court's or-
der to impose a constructive trust over profits and to grant the gov-
ernment punitive damages fits logically into the scheme of available
remedies. 63 In spite of this, the Supreme Court reinstated the con-
structive trust and denied punitive damages. The Court's reasoning
for denying punitive damages was based on the practical problem due
to the practical problem of forcing the government to prove such
damages while maintaining the secrecy of certain facts necessary to
prove its case. 164
A constructive trust was possible only by the Court's extending
the concept of the duty of confidentiality owed by the former agent to
the intelligence agency. Stressing the importance of this duty of con-
fidentiality provided the equitable consideration on which the imposi-
tion of a constructive trust was justified.
However, the imposition of a trust still falls short of the greater
degree of control inherent in the injunction. 65 It remains unclear in
the United States whether the CIA Director and Court can retain
ultimate control over the dissemination of unclassified but harmful
intelligence by former agents, or rather, whether injunctions will be
allowed over such material. In order to achieve this control, the
Court must continue to place a higher premium on the concept of an
agent's duty of confidentiality, expressed in the secrecy oath, even fur-
ther than did the Court in Snepp. In this way, a breach of that oath
161. Id. at § 4.3, at 244. Dobbs notes two requirements for imposing a constructive trust
over profits: "that defendant is a conscious wrongdoer," and that "no part of the increase in
value is clearly attributable to the defendant's own laborers." Id.
162. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.9, at 204 (1973).
163. United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926, 936-38 (1979).
164. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 514-16 (1980).
165. For example, if the goal of the author in publishing his book is not financial profit,
then the constructive trust over profits would not be much of a deterrent measure.
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and corresponding duty of confidence would justify an imposition of
an injunction.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States and the United Kingdom have developed
nearly identical secrecy contracts to prevent the divulgence of govern-
ment information by intelligence agency employees. The existence of
the First Amendment has not prevented the United States Supreme
Court from holding the secrecy contract constitutional. However,
while the United States Supreme Court subjects the agent who
breached the contract to only a post-publication penalty, a construc-
tive trust, British courts advocate the use of a pre-publication re-
straint, the injunction. As discussed above, the pre-publication
restraint affords the government more control over the dissemination
of its secrets.
There is one fundamental difference between the United States
and British courts which accounts for the disparity in control over the
publication of secrets. The British courts place a higher premium on
the duty of confidentiality. Only the fact that an agent breaches that
duty justifies imposition of the most effective device to preserve confi-
dentiality, the injunction. The secrecy contract merely provides evi-
dence that a trust relationship existed between an agent and the
government. In contrast, a United States court has little control over
an agent who intends to publish unclassified government information
without the secrecy contract. Even with the contract, the Snepp
Court only imposed a constructive trust, and not an injunction.
The espionage statutes in the United States do not give agencies a
great deal of pre-publication control because they are construed only
as criminal statutes. In contrast, finding that Wright violated the Offi-
cial Secrets Act allowed the House of Lords to support the imposition
of the civil remedy of an injunction. The court considered the Official
Secrets Act merely a representation of the value for the duty of confi-
dentiality. Again, a breach of that duty justified an injunction against
publication.
In some ways Lord Ackner's observation that United States
courts are "powerless to control the press was correct." 166 The
Supreme Court has not yet used the injunction to restrain unclassified
material from being published by former intelligence agents, however
166. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
1989]
376 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 11:345
harmful the dissemination of such information is to security interests.
However, the development of the secrecy contract and its key role in
binding an agent to maintain the confidences, to which he has had
privileged access as a government agent, has helped to compensate for
this limited control over government information in the United States.
The next step for the United States Supreme Court is to expand the
application of the secrecy oath to allow for injunctions over the publi-
cation of any intelligence information which poses irreparable harm
to national security interests.
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